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Quantitative Assessment of Lives Lost Due
to Delay in the Regulation of Occupational
Exposure to Benzene
by William J. Nicholson* and Philip J. Landrigan*
Benzene exposure can cause leukemia, aplastic anemia, and possibly lymphoma. In 1978, on the basis of
strong but incomplete data then available on the risk ofbenzene-induced leukemia, the U.S. Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) reduced thepermissible occupational exposure standard forbenzene
from 10ppm to 1 ppm. Shortly thereafter, the Fifth Circuit Court ofAppeals stayed this ruling, and in 1980,
the Supreme Court overturned the regulation, citing insufficient evidence ofbenefit. Thus, from 1978 until
the standard was again lowered to 1 ppm in 1987, American workers were exposed to benzene at levels in ex-
cess of 1 ppm. An estimated 9600 were exposed to levels between 1 and 10 ppm, and an additional 370 were
exposed at levels above 10 ppm.
To assess the risk resulting from this delay in regulation, we have conducted anepidemiologic risk analy-
sis. We merged data on numbers ofpersons (238,000) exposed to benzene in seven occupational categories
with dose-response data from three epidemiologic studies. The range ofrisk in these studies indicates that
44 to 152 excess leukemia deaths will ultimately result from exposure to benzene at 10 ppm over a working
lifetime (45 years) and that lower or briefer exposures will result in proportionately fewer deaths. On this
basis, we calculated that between 30 and 490 excess leukemia deaths will ultimately result from occupational
exposures to benzene greater than 1 ppm that occurred between 1978 and 1987. Deaths from aplastic ane-
mia and lymphoma will likely add to this toll. These data confirm the risk of regulatory delay. They sug-
gest that the courts, in reviewing public health regulations, must beware of facile cost-benefit arguments
and be willing to accept strong evidence of health risk even when such evidence is incomplete.
Introduction
Clinical, epidemiologic, and toxicologic data indicate
that occupational exposure to benzene can cause leuke-
mia. The etiologic association was first suggested by case
reports originiating more than 50 years ago (1-5). Those
observations were corroborated by epidemiologic studies
among shoe workers (6), chemical workers, and rubber
workers (7-11). Recently, benzene has been found to be
carcinogenic in animal bioassays (12-16). Benzene was
formally declared a human carcinogen by the National In-
stitute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) in
1976(17), by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) in 1979 (18), and by the International Agency for
Research on Cancer (IARC) in 1982 (19).
The regulatory history ofbenzene has been turbulent.
Particular controversy has surrounded efforts to regulate
occupational exposure to benzene at relatively low levels,
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because until recently only qualitative information was
available on the risk ofleukemia at low levels ofexposure
to benzene. In 1978 the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) promulgated an occupational ex-
posure standard reducing permissible workers' ex-
posures by 10-fold, from the previously acceptable 8 hr
time-weighted average (TWA8) of 10 ppm to 1 ppm (20).
This action was based on information from case reports
and two epidemiologic studies (21). Both ofthose studies
demonstrated statistically significant excess mortality
from leukemia in workers exposed to benzene, but
neither presented sufficient data on exposure to permit
examination ofquantitative dose-response relationships
(8,9).
On July 2, 1980, in a decision of profound importance
for governmental risk assessment, the U.S. Supreme
Court invalidated the OSHAbenzene standard of 1 ppm
(22). The Court stated that OSHA had failed to provide
substantial evidence ofthe need for regulation, in that it
had not quantified a "significant risk of material health
impairment" at the previous level of 10 ppm and had not
established that a new standard would achieve "a sub-
stantial reduction in significant risk." As a result ofthis
decision, workers in the United States were allowed to
be exposed at levels up to 10 ppm. That situation per-NICHOLSON AND LANDRIGAN
sisted until December 1987 when, on the basis of new,
highly quantitative epidemiologic and toxicologic data,
OSHA reimposed a 1-ppm standard (23).
We have undertaken a quantitative assessment ofthe
number of excess deaths from leukemia that ultimately
will result from this 10-year delay inregulation. This anal-
ysis merges information developedby OSHA on numbers
ofworkers exposed to benzene atvarious concentrations
in seven industrial categories with quantitative data from
epidemiologic studies on risk of benzene-induced leuke-
mia. This analysis provides abasis for reconsideration of
the premises underlying the 1980 Supreme Court deci-
sion on benzene.
Methods
Populations Exposed to Benzene
In its final benzene rule, OSHA provided estimates of
the numbers of workers exposed to various concentra-
tions of benzene in the U.S. in seven different occupa-
tional categories (23). Overall in 1987, 238,000 workers
were occupationally exposed to benzene; approximately
10,000 wokers were exposed to time-weighted concentra-
tions in excess of the 1-ppm standard promulgated by
OSHA in 1978 (Table 1). Earlier estimates by OSHA had
suggested a greater population exposure; the proposed
rule (24) had indicated that 274,000 were exposed, 27,500
to concentrations in excess of 1 ppm.
Epidemiologic Risk Assessments
Between 1982 and 1988, at least seven quantitative risk
assessments were published evaluating the risk ofleuke-
mia in persons exposed to benzene. IARC (19) estimated
that 140 to 170 excess leukemia deaths would occur per
1000 workers exposed to benzene for a 45-year working
lifetime at levels of 10 to 100 ppm (10) and that 72 excess
deaths per 1000 workers would occur from exposures of
the same duration at levels between 1 and 30 ppm (9). Us-
ing geometric means to estimate average exposures,
these data suggest that 44 to 132 excess deaths from
leukemia will occur per 1000 workers exposed at 10 ppm
benzene for a 45-year working lifetime.
OSHA staff members published a risk assessment
which estimated that 44 to 152 excess leukemia deaths
will occur per 1000 workers for the same exposure con-
ditions (25). Another risk assessment commissioned by
OSHA for their review ofthe standard in 1984 indicated
the best estimate ofrisk to be 95 excess leukemia deaths
per 1000 workers at benzene exposures of 10 ppm for a
working lifetime (23). This estimate was based on an anal-
ysis ofdatafrom three exposed populations. A 1979 EPA
assessment, although methodologically imprecise, was in
approximate agreement with the above analyses (18).
Those risk assessments used slightly different metho-
dologies and considered different models forthe dose- and
time-course ofbenzene-related leukemias. Nevertheless,
the results were in remarkable agreement. The results
of all ofthe analyses fall within the range of the OSHA
estimate of 44 to 152 excess leukemia deaths per 1000
workers exposed to benzene for 45 years at concentra-
tions of 10 ppm. All of the above analyses were based
upon estimates of group exposure.
More recently, research has been published by Rinsky
et al. (11) on the risk ofleukemia related to the benzene
exposures of individual subjects. The results indicate,
thatthe above assessments based on group exposure may
actually underestimate the risk ofbenzene-induced leuke-
mia. Table 2 shows observed and expected deaths from
leukemia according to cumulative individual exposure. A
weighted least-squares regression line through an SMR
of 100 at zero exposure yields the relationship:
SMR = 100 + 0.035 x ppm.
The standard error on the coefficient of cumulative ex-
posure in this equation is 0.024 to 0.045.
Rinsky et al. performed a matched case-control analy-
sis oftheir data using conditional logistic regression. The
odds ratio (OR) for leukemia in relation to cumulative
benzene exposure was determined to be
OR = exp(0.0126 x ppm-years).
Because ofthe exponential relationship, risks predicted
by this model are extremely high for cumulative ex-
posures in excess of 300 ppm-years.
We have estimated the excess leukemiamortality from
this exposure-response relationship using alife-table anal-
ysis, with the risk lagged by 5 years. The results for a
45-year exposure, beginning at age 25, suggest that 71 to
132 of 1000 workers initially exposed to benzene at 10
ppm will die of benzene-related leukemia. A dose-
response relationship determined from a case-control
analysis of the data from this study suggests an even
higher mortality.
Table 1. Number ofworkers exposed to benzene and current exposure levels by industry divisions (23).
Exposure category by 8-hr time-weighted average benzene concentrations, ppm Total number
Industry 0.0-0.1 0.11-0.5 0.51-1.0 1.1-5.0 5.1-10 10+ of workers
Petrochemical plants - 3,208 - 989 103 0 4,300
Petroleum refineries 30,715 12,410 2,187 1,807 238 190 47,547
Coke and coal chemicals 00 372 261 260 42 12 947
Tire manufacturers 34,710 24,375 4,095 1,820 - - 65,000
Bulk terminals 15,661 8,887 1,436 1,003 81 27 27,095
Bulk plants 26,197 14,866 2,402 1,677 136 45 45,323
Transportation via tank truck 32,558 10,996 2,523 1,380 48 95 47,600
Totals 139,841 75,113 12,904 8,936 647 370 237,812
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An analysis by Crump and Allen (26), which used the
same data base as that used by Rinsky et al. (11), and
which employed a relative risk model, found an excess
risk of death from leukemia of 72 per 1000 workers ex-
posed to 10 ppm for a 45-year working lifetime.
An additional analysis ofthe data of Rinsky et al. was
undertaken by Austin et al. (2?) usingthe risk assessment
methodology proposed by Enterline et al. (28). This anal-
ysis estimated that 125 excess leukemia deaths could re-
sult per 1000 workers exposed for a45-year working life-
time to 10 ppm benzene. A further analysis by Austin et
al., based on the Dow Chemical Company cohort (9),
found that 69 excess leukemia deaths would result per
1000 workers exposed over a45-year working lifetime to
10 ppm benzene.
Results
From these risk assessments, we have estimated the
number oflives ofAmerican workers that ultimately will
be lost because of exposure to unnecessarily high concen-
trations ofbenzene between 1978 and 1987. We used data
on the sizes ofthe exposed population from Table 1. We
used the estimate from OSHA (25) that 44 to 152 excess
leukemia deaths per 1000 workers will result from 45
years ofoccupational exposure to benzene at 10 ppm and
that shorter and lower exposures will result in propor-
tionally fewer deaths (i.e., that risk is linearly related to
cumulative exposure). We calculate, on the basis ofthose
estimates, that 30 to 105 premature leukemia deaths will
eventuallybe caused by benzene exposures resultingfrom
the delay in implementing a 1-ppm standard between
February 1978 and September 1987. In addition
to the leukemia deaths, deaths from aplastic anemia and
lymphomas will likely add to this toll. If, on the other
hand, the earlier population exposure estimates ofOSHA
(24) are used, the excess leukemia death toll will range
from 140 to 490. If one uses the dose-response relation-
ship of Rinsky et al. and the population estimates ofTa-
ble 1, depending on assumptions made about exposures
prior to 1978, the number of excess deaths will range
from 80 to 1000 or more.
The above mortality estimates were calculated using
the relationship
Total deaths = Pi x (Ei - Er) x R x (9.6/45)
Here Pi is thepopulation (in thousands)in one ofthe three
highest exposure categories ofTable 1; Ei is the category
average benzene exposure in ppm; Er is the residual ex-
posure under a 1-ppm standard; R is the risk for a45-year
exposure to 1 ppm, either 4.4/1000 or 15.2/1000 and
(9.6/45) is the fraction of45 years that the 1-ppm standard
was delayed. The average exposures used in these calcu-
lations were geometric means, 2.2 ppm and 7.1 ppm for
the exposure ranges 1.1 to 5.0 ppm and 5.1 to 10 ppm,
respectively, and 30 ppm for the 10 + ppm category. We
assumed that the residual average exposure for in-
dividuals in these categories under a 1-ppm PEL stan-
dard would be 0.3 ppm. Typically, average exposures can-
not exceed one-third of the PEL if compliance with the
standard is to be maintained.
It is not certain which ofthese estimates is correct. The
lowest is very likely an underestimate, because the popu-
lation estimated in the OSHA final rule were derived
principally from exposure concentrations measured after
1985; higher exposure values would likely have existed
in earlier years. The highest estimate may be an overes-
timate, because ofuncertainties in the dose-response rela-
tionship (stemming from the small ofcases), particularly
Discussion
The data presented in this analysis show that a court-
imposed 10-year delay in the regulation of occupational
exposure to benzene resulted in substantial unnecessary
excess mortality from leukemia (29). The U.S. Supreme
Court, in its 1980 ruling, established a new criterion that
must henceforth be met by OSHA in the promulgation of
workplace health standards, namely, that a "significant"
risk must be shown to exist underpresent conditions and
that this risk will be significantly reduced by a new stan-
dard. This approach to regulation breaks precedent with
Table 2. Observed and expected deaths from leukemia in rubber workers exposed to benzene between 1940 and 1965 by cumulative exposure
and years of latency (11).
Exposure, ppm-year
Latency, years 0.001-40 40-200 200-400 >400 Totalsa
<5 2/0.10 0/0.02 - - 2/0.12
5-10 0/0.16 0/0.05 0/0.01 - 0/0.22
10-15 0/0.22 1/0.07 1/0.02 0/0.00 2/0.31
15-20 0/0.27 '1/0.09 1/0.03 2/0.01 3/0.39
20-25 0/0.32 0/0.10 0/0.03 1/0.01 1/0.46
25-30 0/0.37 0/0.12 0/0.04 0/0.01 0/0.54
>30 0/0.40 0/0.16 1/0.04 0/0.01 1/0.62
Totalsa 2/1.83 2/0.62 2/0.17 3/0.04 9/2.66
Standardized mortality ratio 109 322 1,186 6,637 337
Confidence interval 12-394 36-1,165 133-4,285 1,334-19,393 154-641
aThe numbers of expected deaths have been rounded.
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long-standing tradition in public health. The tradition
urges in the interest of disease prevention that public
health regulations be set early, even on the basis of in-
complete evidence. That approach embodies a conscious
decision to err on the side ofprevention in regulatory de-
cision making (30). In the decade of regulatory inaction
that followed the Supreme Court decision, additional
epidemiologic and toxicologic data were developed on
benzene. These data confirmed and strengthened the
results ofearlier analyses and documented the existence
of exposure-related risk. However, as we have shown,
this additional certainty was gained at a cost (31).
Importantly, the Supreme Court did not require that
OSHA conduct a cost-benefit analysis, the basis on which
the Fifth Circuit Court ofAppeals initially vacated the
1978 standard. Also, the Supreme Court provided some
guidance as to what might constitute a "significant health
risk," suggestingthat ariskof1 death per 1000from reg-
ular exposure might well qualify. The residual risk from
a 45-year exposure to 1 ppm of benzene vapor is esti-
mated to range from 4 to 15 deaths per 1000 exposed.
While OSHA has finally made progress in reducing
what was clearly a significant risk in the case ofbenzene,
several aspects ofthe Supreme Court decision continue
to have disturbing ramifications. First, this decision im-
plies that less than significant risks need not be regu-
lated, even though such regulation might be economically
feasible and ofpublic health benefit. Second, individual
risk was the only criterion listed for consideration; no
mention was made of considering the number of in-
dividuals exposed to agiven risk. Is ariskto 500 workers
to be considered the same as a risk to 5 million workers
in terms ofsignificance? Finally, the Supreme Court de-
cision may turn future regulatory hearings into forums
arguing such nebulous questions as what risk is "signifi-
cant" orwhatbenefit is "substantial," rather thanfocus-
ing on such basic scientific issues as identification of
health effects, definition of dose-response relationships,
and design of control measures.
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